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INSIDER TRADING, INVESTOR HARM,
AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
Robert B. Thompsont
The core questions in most law school classes change little
from year to year even as the contexts in which those questions are
raised and the answers which are provided sometimes move dra-
matically to reflect cutting-edge adaptations and changing regula-
tory policy. Insider trading has been one of those core questions in
corporate and securities law since the early 1960s when the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission's decision in In re Cady, Roberts &
Co.1 propelled Rule lOb-5 into the center of the debate over the regu-
lation of such conduct. With the publication of Henry Manne's book
Insider Trading and the Stock Market five years later defending this
practice,2 the issue was joined in a way that still shapes how courts
and writers frame the topic. This essay addresses insider trading at
the turn of the century by looking at three key assertions from
Manne's 1966 book: (1) there is no coherent theory explaining regu-
lation of insider trading;3 (2) there is no significant injury to corporate
investors from insider trading;4 and (3) insider trading constitutes the
most appropriate device for compensating entrepreneurs in large cor-
porations. 5 Each of the parts which follow this introduction identifies
the underlying premise for each assertion, the flourish with which
Dean Manne presented it, the extent to which it has shaped debate
over the last thirty-three years, and its place in the current discussion.
t George Alexander Madill Professor of Law, Washington University, St. Louis, Mis-
souri. This article is a revision of remarks delivered at the Symposium held in Williamsburg,
Virginia in May, 1999. I benefitted from the comments of Steve Bainbridge and Charles Elson
on an earlier draft of this Article.
1 Securities Exhange Act of 1934 Release No. 8-3925, 40 S.E.C. 907 (Nov. 8, 1961).
Federal regulation of insider trading existed prior to 1961 under section 16 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78p, but the reach of that statute extended only to a limited
set of insiders (officers, directors, or 10% shareholders) who engaged in two transactions, both
buying and selling, within a six-month period for companies whose shares are traded in a na-
tional market. Under Rule lOb-5, the reach of regulation has been extended beyond these
statutory insiders to include tippees, constructive insiders and misappropriators with only one
transaction required for any security, not just those listed or traded on a national exchange.
2 HENRY G. MANta, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKEr (1966) [hereinafter
INSIDER TRADING].
3 See id. chs. 1-3.
4 See id. chs. 4-7.
5 See id. chs. 8-10.
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I. THE ABSENCE OF A COHERENT THEORY
Manne's book opens with chapters devoted to the assertion that
"in the literature on insider trading almost no careful analysis of the
subject exists."6  In discussing the traditional legal approach and
opinions from courts, commentators, and legislative hearings, Dean
Manne's language was somewhat mild compared to the other topics
addressed later in the book and he was ecumenical in suggesting that
arguments on both sides were "disappointing" 7 and "conclusionary." s
His underlying premise was that the existing doctrines based on mo-
rality or "it's just not right" provided no foundation for determining
regulation of insider trading, but that economic analysis could.9
On this point Jon Macey's opening paragraph, "The same, of
course, is true today"10 is very apt. Commentators regularly assail the
incoherence of the law of insider trading" terming it problematic, 12 if
not "seriously flawed."' 3 Since the Supreme Court's 1997 decision in
United States v. O'Hagan,14 legal commentaries have been appearing
at an average of around one a month.' 5 As summarized by former
SEC commissioner Roberta Karmel, "despite the large number of ar-
ticles discussing insider trading, a general consensus among com-
mentators has not developed as to why insider trading is unlawful."' 6
There have been three movements so far in the development of
federal law of insider trading under Rule lOb-5. Henry Manne en-
6 Id. at 15.
7 Id. at 5 (describing the position of Robert Walker in a 1923 article opposing regulation).
8 Id. at 5, 10 (describing arguments of Professor H.L. Wilgus in a 1910 article supporting
regulation and in the House Report accompanying the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
9 See id. at 15; see also id. at 46 ("There is in today's literature, however, very little
analysis helpful to a court or a legislature asked to resolve the issues posed by the Texas Gulf
Sulphur case.").
1o Jonathan R. Macey, Securities Trading: A Contractual Perspective, 50 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 269,269 (1999).
1 See James D. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the "Chi-
cago School," 1986 DuKE L.J. 628, 634 (asserting that aggressive enforcement of insider trad-
ing "without a coherent, let alone articulated, philosophy of regulation is one of the most unset-
tling aspects of the federal securities laws").
12 See Paula J. Dalley, From Horse Trading to Insider Trading: The Historical Antece-
dents of the Insider Trading Debate, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1289, 1293-94 (1998).
13 See Jill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for Insider Trading
Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 179, 184 (1991).
14 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
15 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path Dependent
Choice Betveen Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 53 SMU L. REv. _ (1999); Victor
Brudney, O'Hagan's Problems, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 249; Dalley, supra note 12; Fisch, supra
note 13; Donna Nagy, Reframing the Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading Liability: A
Post-O'Hagan Suggestion, 59 OHuo ST. L.J. 1223 (1998); Richard W. Painter et al., Don't Ask,
Just Tell: Insider Trading After United States v. O'Hagan, 84 VA. L. REV. 153 (1998); Alan
Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral Principle in the Law of Insider Trading (1999) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
16 Roberta S. Karmel, Outsider Trading on Confidential Information-A Breach in Search
of a Duty, 20 CARDoZo L. REv. 83, 83 (1998).
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tered the debate as the first movement was already in progress. He
clearly arrested the progression of that movement and shaped the sec-
ond, but the third has spun in a different direction.
A. The First Movement: Establishment of a Federal Cause of
Action for Insider Trading Under Rule 1Ob-5.
Although state insider trading cases go back through the twenti-
eth century, it was only with the SEC's In re Cady, Roberts & Co. 17
decision in 1961 that the development of the federal cause of action
began to gain momentum. Dean Joel Seligman tells us that when Bill
Cary came to Washington to head the SEC in the Kennedy admini-
stration, he arrived with no overall agenda but with one priority:' 8 to
use section 10(b) to reverse state corporation law decisions such as
Goodwin v. Agassiz.19 It seems clear that Chairman Cary was suc-
cessful as to this priority. As Louis Loss wrote in 1983, discussing
the so-called majority and minority rules at common law, thanks to
Rule lOb-5 the minority rule has become "the law of the land., 20 The
law of the land perhaps, but it was not in Dean Manne's view a co-
herent theory.21 The parity of information approach suggested by
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,22 the leading judicial decision of this
era, had the potential to take in any and all trading where there was
any material information disparity, a breadth that subsequent courts
were unable to fit within the statutory authorization.
B. The Second Movement: Narrowing the Focus in Chiarella and
Dirks and an Evolution Toward Property Rights.
In 1980, the Supreme Court's opinion in Chiarella v. United
States 23 ushered in the second movement of federal insider trading
law. Chiarella rejected the broad parity of information rule from
Texas Gulf Sulphur,24 and the prior focus on generalized notions of
17 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 8-3925,40 S.E.C. 907 (Nov. 8, 1961).
15 See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 334 (1982).
'9 186 N.E. 659 (Mass. 1933) (applying what has sometimes been termed the majority
rule that directors have no fiduciary duty to shareholders in purchasing shares with inside in-
formation; such action is permissible when done impersonally through a stock market).20 Louis Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 823 (1983).
21 See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 2, at 13 (stating that Professor Cary's view "displays
conviction but not proof').
" 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
23 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
24 401 F.2d at 848 ("The essence of the Rule is that anyone who, trading for his own ac-
count in the securities of a corporation has 'access, directly or indirectly, to information in-
tended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone'
may not take 'advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is
dealing,' i.e., the investing public.") (citing In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 at 912).
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fairness and harm to investors.25 It re-centered the legal focus on the
other party to the transaction, emphasizing the fraudulent conduct of
the insider and relying on tort concepts developed in the common law
action of deceit.26 The Court's decision three years later in Dirks v.
SEC27 recognized the idea of information as a commodity that was
developed in Manne's book by finding that Raymond Dirks' use of
information gained from his investigation of the Equity Funds scandal
did not violate Rule lOb-5 where the person conveying the informa-
tion to Dirks had breached no duty in doing so.21 Indeed, Justice
Blackmun's dissent suggested the majority had in effect adopted a
position consistent with Manne's views that the dissent termed an
extreme theory.29 Yet the Court's structure and Manne's focus on
information as a commodity opened the way for development of the
property rights justification for insider trading regulation, a justifica-
tion later championed by Frank Easterbrook and Ralph Winter, two
notable economics-oriented law professors turned judges.30
Indeed, Stephen Bainbridge has observed that "there is an
emerging consensus that the federal insider trading prohibition is
most easily justified as a means of protecting property rights in in-
formation." 31 Unfortunately for the sake of theoretical consistency,
this property rights justification fits uneasily within the structure of a
federal statute addressing only securities fraud. As defined in a prop-
erty rights context, federal insider trading regulation would extend to
protect employment and other relationships in which a fiduciary used
information of the principal. Indeed the focus necessarily ends up on
protecting such relationships-traditionally a concern of state law-
much more than protecting the securities transaction and securities
25 See id. ("FIhe Rule is based in policy on the justifiable expectation of the securities
marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to
material information.").
26 See 445 U.S. at 232 ("[N]ot every instance of financial unfairness constitutes fraudulent
activity under § 10(b).").
2' 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
See id. at 658 ("Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because a person know-
ingly receives material nonpublic information from an insider and trades on it could have an
inhibiting influence on the role of market analysts.").
29 See id. at 677 n.14 (Blacknun, J., dissenting). This is one of the rare Supreme Court
citations of Manne's work.
" See Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges and
the Production of Information, 1981 Sup. CT. REv. 309; United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d
551, 576-77 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc) (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("That rationale may be summarized as follows. Information is perhaps the most precious
commodity in commercial markets. It is expensive to produce, and, because it involves facts
and ideas that can be easily photocopied or carried in one's head, there is a ubiquitous risk that
those who pay to produce information will see others reap the profit from it. Where the profit
from an activity is likely to be diverted, investment in that activity will decline. If the law fails
to protect property rights in commercial information, therefore, less will be invested in generat-
ing such information."), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1004 (1992).
31 STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, INSIDER TRADING, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS
(forthcoming, 1999).
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trader that is the focus of federal law. Judge Winter, who gave judi-
cial recognition to this theory in U.S. v. Chestman, frankly acknowl-
edged that:
[A]ny obvious relationship to Section 10(b) is presently
missing because theft rather than fraud or deceit, seems the
gravamen of the prohibition .... Nevertheless, the law is far
enough down this road-indeed, the Insider Trading Sanc-
tions Act seems premised on Section 10(b)'s applicability-
that a court of appeals has no option but to continue the
route.
3 2
C. The Third Movement: Agency Law and a Return to Broader
Principles.
The federalism concern just described led to the third movement
in federal insider trading regulation ushered in by the O'Hagan case
two years ago. Two other federal courts of appeals did not feel the
constraint of precedent Judge Winter identified in Chestman. Instead,
they found that a trader who misappropriated information from a
source other than a shareholder, or another to whom a fiduciary duty
was owed, had not engaged in wrongful conduct that was "in connec-
tion with" the securities transaction in which the defendant purchased
or sold shares. 33 In their view, such conduct may have been wrong-
ful, but it was not a violation of the federal securities laws. The nar-
rowing interpretations relied on an earlier Supreme Court interpreta-
tion in Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green,3 4 not an insider trading case, in
which the Court sought to draw a line between federal securities
regulation that focused on deception practiced on investors and state
corporation law addressing the fiduciary responsibility of corporate
officers. Misappropriation and the focus generally on property rights
could make no strong claim to federal concern. 35 Santa Fe was paired
with the Court's more recent decision in Central Bank,36 also not an
insider trading decision, but one that emphasized the limitations on
judicial interpretations of implied private rights of action under Rule
lOb-5.
This argument had no natural stopping point at misappropriation
as the only strand of insider trading liability excluded from the reach
of Rule lOb-5. It could apply as well to much of the traditional regu-
32 Chestman, 947 F.2d at 578.
33 See United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 521 U.S. 642 (1997);
United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995).
3 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
35 Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
36 U.S. v. Brayn, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995); U.S. v. O'Hagan, 92 F.2d 612 (8th Cir.
1996), rev'd 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
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lation of classic insider trading liability excluded from the reach of
Rule lOb-5. It could apply as well to much of the traditional regula-
tion of classic insider trading which after Chiarella seemed to turn
more on protecting the fiduciary relationship of directors and share-
holders than on protecting deception practiced on investors. Yet the
same Court that had pronounced the limitations of Santa Fe three
years later decided Chiarella, unconstrained by Santa Fe. Two dec-
ades later, the Court in O'Hagan set out an interpretation of insider
trading unconstrained by the holding three terms before in Central
Bank. The Court reforged the connection between the wrongful in-
sider conduct and securities trading using a justification that had more
in common with the earlier Texas Gulf Sulphur-era opinions than it
did with property rights.37 This third movement shifts away from the
tort focus of Chiarella with its emphasis on the common law elements
of deceit and relies more on agency law and principles of restitution.
While that touchstone may seem more consistent with the focus on
information as the property of the corporation from the Manne book,
the overall tone of the opinion is not to leave the rules to private or-
dering as Manne suggested, but rather to rules provided by govern-
ment.
It also leaves some strange gaps. For example, a defendant can
avoid liability under Rule lOb-5 simply by notifying the principal
prior to making the trade. In that setting, the role for the federal gov-
ernment is surprisingly narrow and serves only to supplement the le-
gal agency relationships created by state common law. By disclosing
to the principal the violation of the agent's fiduciary duty, the princi-
pal will then be able to enforce existing agency obligations under
common law-assuming the principal can find the agent and the pro-
ceeds of the trade. This illustrates what I have elsewhere described as
the BASF model of federal/state roles in corporate governance, be-
cause of the similarity of the intended federal role to the television
commercials of the international chemical firm that present a varia-
tion of the theme "[w]e don't make the cars you buy, we make them
stronger."38 Federal law doesn't define shareholder rights but rather
serves to make effective the rights developed at common law to cabin
the behavior of agents.
An alternative federal justification that could evolve in this
broader theoretical environment defined by O'Hagan is that federal
regulation can be explained as part of the SEC's efforts to protect
markets from manipulation. This argument gives appropriate central-
ity to a federal purpose, and supports both classic insider trading and
37 O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642.
38 Robert B. Thompson, Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance: Protect-
ing Shareholder Rights to Vote, Sell and Sue, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. No. 3 (forthcoming,
1999).
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misappropriation. Yet this justification is missing from O'Hagan. It
seems fair to say that after almost forty years of judicial and academic
efforts to develop a coherent theory to explain federal insider trading
regulation, the literature is no more coherent than it was in 1966.
II. SHAREHOLDERS AS A WHOLE ARE NOT HURT BY INSIDER
TRADING
The second assertion, the focus of the middle part of Manne's
book, is that no significant injury to corporate investors results from
insider trading.39 The subtext here is one of efficiency of markets.4°
Insider trading makes the market more efficient by moving the price
in the right direction. An event or information that alters the value of
the company and its stock will create a gap between the stock's cur-
rent value and what it will trade for once the market has incorporated
the new information.
Time-function traders, whose trading decisions are based on rea-
sons beyond a change in price, benefit by receiving a better price as
compared to what they would have received absent the insider trad-
ing. The premise is that they would have traded anyway (and before
the disclosure of the new information and the accompanying change
in price), and therefore would have absorbed the entire gap related to
the change in value. The time-function trader benefits by whatever
amount toward the new price the insider trader causes the price to
move.
In contrast, price-function traders, whose trading decisions are
motivated by a change in price, can be disadvantaged as compared to
where they would have been absent the insider trading. Absent the
change in price caused by the insider trader entering the market, the
price-function traders would not have traded and presumably still
would have had their shares when the information was later an-
nounced and the price changed in response to that announcement. If
this group is further segmented to focus on long-term investors rather
than short-swing traders, and the lens is widened to focus on all such
traders over time and not just those in a particular stock and a par-
ticular time, the magnitude of the loss defined this way gets consid-
erably smaller. Indeed, Dean Manne does not hold back in how he
describes this risk: "de minimis... almost infinitesimally small...
[and] so small as to be unworthy of serious concern. ' 41
39 See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 2, at 182.
4 What is presented here as a subtext that insider trading promotes efficient market may
be distinct from the injury to investors rationale if insider trading makes the market more effi-
cient but shareholders are nonetheless injured. See STEPHEN BANBRIDGE, SECuRrrES LAW:
INSIDER TRADING 128-36 (1999).
41 Id. at 110.
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On this point, the impact of Manne's work is substantial. The
challenge to show investor harm has been difficult and complex.
42
Despite explicit congressional action authorizing a cause of action for
those who trade contemporaneously with an insider,43 private en-
forcement of insider trading is small and the heavy lifting has been
left to the SEC and the Justice Department. Professor Donald
Langevoort has concluded that the addition of section 20A to the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 makes "private rights of action by
marketplace traders something of relatively small practical impor-




In the wake of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 45 private actions for insider trading have taken on more impor-
tance as allegations of that conduct commonly are used as a way to
meet the heightened pleading standards now required for securities
class actions. Insider trading is one of the two most common factors
cited in securities class action complaints as evidence of particular-
ized facts necessary for a pleading to survive the heightened standards
required by the 1995 Act.47 Yet, that statistic overstates the impor-
tance of private action for insider trading. Plaintiffs usually seek to
use insider trading by individuals to reach not the traders, but the cor-
poration that made false or incomplete disclosures. Based on data in
the Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse database, less
than 10% of the cases alleging insider trading include a count seeking
private relief under section 20A.4 The thirty-seven complaints in the
database as of June, 1999 that include a count based on section 20A
reduce to only fifteen transactions because of multiple filings; there
was no indication of recovery by that date for any of those lawsuits.49
42 See William K.S. Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic Information in Impersonal
Stock Markets: Who is Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule 10b-5?, 54 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1217 (1981) (discussing the difficulty of identifying a victim of insider trading).
43 See 15 U.S.C. §78t-1 (1994). This section was originally enacted as the Insider Trading
and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988.
44 Donald C. Langevoort, INSIDER TRADING: REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT AND
PREVENTION, in 18 SEC. L. SER., 9-17 (1998).
45 See 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1995) (codifying, as amended, the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995)).
46 Section 21D(b)(2) of the 1934 Act added by the 1995 Reform Act requires that plaintiff
in any private action for money damages "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4.
47 See Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A Perino, Securities Litigation Reform:The First
Year's Experience (John M. Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 140) (re-
porting that more than half of securities class actions claims filed in the year after the 1995 Act
included allegations of insider trading) (Feb. 1997) (on file with author).
4s See Federal Court Securities Class Actions (visited June 10, 1999)
<http://securities.stanford.edu/complaints/complaints.html>. There were 761 cases in the data-
base on that date, but only thirty-seven list section 20A. See id. Grundfest and Perino note that
more than half of them mention insider trading. See Grundfest & Perino, supra note 47, at iii.
49 See Federal Court Securities Class Actions (visited June 10, 1999)
<http://securities.stanford.edu/complaints/complaints.html>.
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There appears to be little, if any, overlap between those private
cases and the insider cases brought by the government, which average
around fifty per year.50 Of the fifteen companies for which insider
trading was alleged as part of a securities class action, all but one al-
lege selling after inaccurate reports or that bad news was withheld or
covered up.51 For the government suits, the dominant setting is trad-
ing on the basis of good news, such as in advance of tender offers.52
It may be that enforcement of insider trading might evolve into a divi-
sion of responsibility with indirect private enforcement taking a
stronger relative role where the insider's action is to cover up bad
news. It is more likely that the relative unimportance of private en-
forcement in insider trading will continue.
Given the lack of observable direct insider trading harm to indi-
vidual traders, the debate over insider trading has moved in a different
direction. Professors Jon Macey and David Haddock adapted the S
graphs from the middle portion of the Manne book to illustrate that
direct costs of insider trading are borne first by market professionals
and then passed along to market participants through higher spreads
and trading costs. 53 They pursued this to a public choice explanation
of regulation. Michael Dooley's work suggests similar conclusions,
54
as do Dean Manne's later writings about the SEC.
The Supreme Court's current approach to insider trading regula-
tion takes yet another approach to investor harm. In O'Hagan, there
is no mention of individual harm in specific transactions. Rather, the
focus is on harm from a decrease in public confidence in the market.
This could be related to the harm to price function traders that was
explicitly par of Manne's economic calculation. He discussed price
function traders who might not otherwise have traded but who are
induced to trade by the price effect from insider trading that moves
the price off what the price function traders otherwise thought was the
correct market price. The O'Hagan reasoning assumes traders will be
pushed in the opposite direction-to put their money in a mattress or
50 The Annual Reports of the SEC show the number of insider trading prosecutions
around fifty per year during the 1990s.
51 That complaint was filed in Susser v. Florida Panthers Holdings, Inc., No. 97-6084
1997) (S.D. Fla. 1997), available in Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse database,
(visited June 10, 1999) <http:/securities.stanford.edulcomplaintsfloridap/97cv060841001.html>
(alleging that defendants who were officers and directors covered up good news in order to buy
shares at a bargain price).
-2 See Lisa K. Meulbroek, An Empirical Analysis of Illegal Insider Trading, 47 J. FIN.
1661, 1678 (1992) (stating that 79% of all insider information is takeover related).
" See David D. Haddock & Jonathon R. Macey, A Coasian Model ofInsider Trading, 80
Nwv. U. L. REv. 1449, 1452-54, 1469 (1987).
54 See Michael P. Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REv. 1
(1980) (measuring harm to investors and finding none).
" See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV.
547, 554 (1970); Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and Property Rights in New Information, 4
CATo J. 933. 937-943 (1985).
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at least be less inclined to trade because of insider trading.56 The fo-
cus, however, is not on the harm incurred from the foregone trade;
such claims would not be easily susceptible to proof and would be
difficult to calculate under the usual measures of damages. Instead of
identifying individual loss in a specific transaction, the harm is the
loss of market confidence and resulting loss of liquidity in the market
generally.
57
Dean Manne took on the investor confidence argument in his re-
sponse to the critics of his book. He pointed to evidence in the 1920s
and thereafter that "the public has never shown any signs of losing
confidence in the stock market because of the existence of insider
trading." 58 But it is difficult to separate and empirically test factors
that would show such a connection. For example, similar national
regimes under which one country banned insider trading and the other
did not, or findings on liquidity before and after a change in the
regulation of insider trading, cannot be easily isolated from other
factors so as to observe the effect of insider trading. In the face of
such challenges, with harm being so diffuse and difficult to measure,
economics loses some of its relative advantage to politics as an ex-
planatory tool for why we have government regulation.
In such a setting, understanding regulation may require not just
the rational choice economics that is at the core of Manne's work, but
also the learning of behavioral economics and cognitive psychology.
Even if there is no loss or little individual effect as a result of insider
trading, investors may still want the conduct regulated. There may be
a parallel to preferences revealed in various experimental settings of
the ultimatum game. In the ultimatum game, two parties are given a
sum of money to divide. One of the parties is to propose the division;
the other can then choose either to accept or reject. If accepted, the
parties get to keep the proceeds as divided; if rejected, neither gets
anything. Traditional rational choice economics and game theories
based on similar assumptions of self-interested behavior would pre-
dict a small amount to be offered to the second party (so that the sec-
ond party would be better off than if there were no transaction) but
the disproportionate portion to the first party. Instead of such a split,
56 See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997) ("[I]nvestors likely would
hesitate to venture their capital in a market where trading based on misappropriated nonpublic
information is unchecked by law.").
57 See Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the
Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 356 (1979) ("[S]ome investors will refrain
from dealing altogether, and others will incur costs to avoid dealing with such transactors or
corruptly to overcome their unerodable informational advantages.").
58 Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV. 547, 577
(1970). For a current statement of that view, see BAINBRIDGE, supra note 40, at 155 ("The loss
of confidence is further undercut by the stock market's performance since the insider trading
scandals of the mid-1980s .... One can but conclude that insider trading does not seriously
threaten the confidence of investors in the securities markets.").
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many experiments find "offers typically average about 30-40 percent
of the total, with a 50-50 split often the mode. Offers of less than 20
percent are frequently rejected."59 Thus in some settings, players de-
part from the equilibrium predicted by rational self-interest and in-
stead propose a division that is closer to equal sharing.60  Similarly,
shareholders may prefer to limit insider trading even if the harm is not
immediately visible. Part of the attraction of the investor confidence
argument for insider trading is likely a manifestation of the choices
said to be evidenced by the outcome of the ultimatum game.
III. INSIDER TRADING AS ExEcuTIvE COMPENSATION
The third assertion, and the one that provoked most of the uproar
in the 1960s, was that insider trading constitutes the most appropriate
device for compensating entrepreneurs in the large corporation.
Again, Professor Macey has captured the underlying core of Manne's
contribution and how it focused the debate on insider trading as a
matter of intra-firm contract and private ordering; what Macey terms
"an applied executive compensation problem."6' Manne's description
was a bit more dramatic, asserting that insider trading "may be fun-
damental to the survival of our corporate system ' 62 and that those
pressing for a rule banning insider trading "may inadvertently be
tampering with one of the wellsprings of American prosperity." 63
On this assertion, Manne's analysis has not changed the legal
result. Our corporate system has both survived and prospered in the
last third of the twentieth century even as insider trading has become
more regulated. The rest of the world has moved more in the direc-
tion of regulating insider trading rather than away from it. 64
59 Colin Camerer & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Ultimatur, Dictators and Manners, J.
ECON. PERSP., Spring 1995, at 209-10 (1995).63 This behavior is sometimes discussed in the context of reciprocity norms. See, e.g., Jon
D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behaviorialism Seriously: The Problem of Market
Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 680-81 (1999) ("Reciprocity norms manifest themselves
in numerous ways, most of which seem relevant to the market context For example, individu-
als are often more willing to cooperate with those actors they feel are behaving cooperatively or
fairly. On the other hand, individuals will often refuse to cooperate with others who are being
uncooperative. Moreover, individuals are often willing to sacrifice to hurt others who are being
unfair.") (citations omitted). See also Jennifer Arlen, Comment: The Future of Behavioral Eco-
nomic Analysis of Law, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1765, 1776 (1998) ("[R]isk of perceived unfairness is
greater that it might at first seem because people tend to have a self-serving assessment of what
is fair.").
61 Jonathan R. Macey, Insider Trading, Henry Manne and Academic Life, 50 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 269,281 (1999).
62 INSIDER TRADING, supra note 2, at 110.
6 Id.
64 In part, the preference may reflect an association with American prosperity of that
period. More specifically it may reflect the efforts of American regulators. See also David D.
Haddock, Academic Hostility and SEC Acquiescence: Henry Manne's Insider Trading, 50 CASE
W. RES. L REV. 313, 316-17 (1999) (discussing the status and evolution of government regula-
tion of insider trading).
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The executive compensation aspect has faltered in part because
there has not been widespread acceptance of Manne's assertion that:
Information is not a free good, and we should not assume,
without more information than we now possess, that its dis-
tribution is generally capricious, arbitrary, random, or un-
controlled. Rational, self-serving individuals will not
blithely and willingly allow information of tremendous value
to pass freely to individuals who have no valid claim upon it.
The safer assumption is that individuals with the power to
control the flow of valuable information do so rationally and
allocate it in a market-like system of exchange .... 65
Yet except perhaps for Raymond Dirks, who was an entrepre-
neur of sorts and for whom the Supreme Court found no legal liabil-
ity,66 the defendants in the visible insider trading cases have not been
entrepreneurs-the group for whom the compensation was seen as
necessary. More illustrative is the lawyer, James O'Hagan, for whom
takeover information provided a needed source of funds,67 or Keith
Loeb in the Chestman case, 68 two generations and one marriage re-
moved from the entrepreneur. Despite Manne's recognition of leak-
age within the rational economic model,69 and despite the possible
distortions of the defendant pool because we no longer have a basis to
test a control group in which insider trading is permitted,70 the domi-
nance of defendants like O'Hagan and Loeb continue to act as a drag
on Manne's executive compensation argument.
More fundamentally, executive compensation has changed in a
way that makes this prong of the insider trading argument less com-
pelling. At the time of writing his book in 1966, Manne based part of
his assertion for insider trading as executive compensation on his
comparative analysis of the various alternatives for compensating en-
trepreneurs. Salary, bonus, profit-sharing plans, and stock options
failed to meet the conditions for appropriately compensating entre-
preneurs. Since 1966, changes in insider compensation have come
closer to filling the need that Manne described. Not only has there
65 INSIDER TRADING, supra note 2, at 158.
66 See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646,665 (1983).67 See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 648 (1997) (affirming O'Hagan's dis-
barrment and reversing his theft conviction resulting from an insider transaction).68 See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 555 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. de-
nied, 503 U.S. 1004 (1992).69 See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 2, at 169 (discussing possible information leakage
but dismissing it as unimportant).
70 As Manne observed in discussing the economics of partial enforcement, "the absence of
the more high-minded participants from a segment of the securities field makes it that much
more lucrative and attractive for those we least want to encourage." Henry G. Manne, Insider
Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. REv. 547, 555 (1970).
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been growth in executive compensation generally, but there is a richer
array of forms that are regularly used.7  The experience of venture
capital financing has produced compensation agreements aimed di-
rectly at compensating start-up entrepreneurs and balancing their re-
turn with others who contribute to the enterprise. Options need not
require that money already be invested, as concerned Manne in 1966,
and there is a greater willingness to make differential awards that
permit payment for entrepreneurial services.
72
These various forms of compensation have some advantages
over insider trading as entrepreneurial compensation. First, they seem
less likely to reward the wrong people. Defining the target group is
direct, although not perfect; information leakage is less likely. Sec-
ond, this compensation is not secret, which makes it easier to monitor.
The Securities and Exchange Commission requires extensive periodic
disclosure of executive compensation for all public companies and
also when companies are selling securities;73 disclosure that was en-
hanced by extensive changes made in 1992.74 In addition, these other
forms of compensation typically require a corporate governance proc-
ess prior to their initial availability, such as action by the directors or
shareholders,75 as opposed to insider trading, which is triggered by the
insider's actions. Compensation is often a volatile issue and has been
so for much of this century.7 6 Currently, executive compensation is
higher than in past periods, 77 and higher in the United States than in
other countries.7 8  In that setting, the disclosure and governance
framework that governs non-insider trading compensation likely has a
71 See generally John Balkcom & Roger Brossy, Executive Pay-Then, Now, and Ahead,
22 Dis. & BDS., Fall 1997, 55, 58 (noting that "trends in executive pay have gone far to align
the interests of the managers and the shareholder").
72 See INSIDER TRADING, supra note 2, at 140.
73 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.401-05 (1999) (republishing as administrative rules, SEC Regu-
lation S-K).
74 See Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 33-6962, 52 SEC Docket 1961, 1963 (Oct. 16,
1992) (requiring new disclosure as to options and stock appreciation rights and requiring disclo-
sure of the relationship between compensation and corporate performance designed to "furnish
shareholders with a more understandable presentation of the nature and extent of executive
compensation").
s See generally Balkcom & Brossy, supra note 71, at 61.
76 See, e.g., Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (challenging the compensation program of the
American Tobacco Company); Salary $12,000, Bonus $1,623,753, THE LITERARY DIGEST,
Aug. 9, 1930, at 10 (publishing the annual compensation of the president of Bethlehem Steel).
77 See generally GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS: THE OVERCOMPENSATION
OF A ERICAN EXECUTIVES 27 (1966) (explaining that executive pay was around thirty-five
times the pay of the average manufacturing worker in 1974 and 120 times the average pay two
decades later).
78 See, e.g., DEREK BOK, THE COST OF TALENT: How EXECuTIVES AND PROFESSIONALS
ARE PAID AND How IT AFFECrS ANERICA 95 (1993) (showing that American levels of corpo-
rate compensation are not replicated in other industrial nations); Deborah Orr, Damn Yankees,
FORBES, May 17, 1999, at 206 (noting average U.S. chief executive's pay still far outpaces the
rest of the world because of long term-incentives like stock options, which while common here,
are rarer abroad).
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comparative advantage as compared to insider trading as compensa-
tion.
IV. CONCLUSION
The three central assumptions that Henry Manne used to present
his defense of insider trading in 1966 remain as relevant signposts in
the debate over regulation more than three decades later. There still is
no coherent analytical approach to this topic, although we have been
through several, sometimes-conflicting approaches during that period.
Economics, particularly the property rights approach that flowed from
Manne's work, has contributed to a richer understanding of insider
trading and became especially influential in judicial doctrine at the
beginning of this decade. To date, there has been no effective answer
to the lack of investor harm as defined by Manne. Instead, the focus
has shifted back to the larger and more amorphous harm to collective
investors. Manne's two challenges to defects in the then-existing at-
tacks on insider trading have fared better than the positive justifica-
tion put forward for permitting insider trading. The argument that
executive compensation in the form of insider trading is needed to
facilitate entrepreneurial activity was a difficult argument to make in
1966 and has receded in its impact since then.
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